PapersWe study the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The Shapley value has been used as an index for measuring the power of individual agents in decision-making bodies and political organizations, where decisions are made by a majority vote process. We characterize the impact of changing the quota (i.e., the minimum number of seats in the parliament that are required to form a coalition) on the Shapley values of the agents. Contrary to previous studies, which assumed that the agent weights (corresponding to the size of a caucus or a political party) are fixed, we analyze new domains in which the weights are stochastically generated, modeling, for example, elections processes.
We examine a natural weight generation process: the Balls and Bins model, with uniform as well as exponentially decaying probabilities. We also analyze weights that admit a super-increasing sequence, answering several open questions pertaining to the Shapley values in such games.
Our results for the balls and bins model with exponentially decaying probabilities rely on a formula for the Shapley values of super-increasing sequences. Curiously, this formula gives rise to a continuous function reminiscent of Minkowski’s question mark function.
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