# Lower Bounds for Cutting Planes Using Games

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#### Executive summary

New perspective on two old results:

- BPR: Lower bounds for cutting planes proofs with small coefficients (Bonet, Pitassi, Raz, 1997).
- K: Interpolation theorems, lower bounds for proof systems, and independence results for bounded arithmetic (Krajíček, 1997).

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Hope is to extend results to arbitrary coefficients.

#### Semantic Cutting Planes.

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- Semantic Cutting Planes.
- Communication protocols.

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Proof of the lower bound.

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- Communication protocols.
- The difficult proposition (BPR version).

- Proof of the lower bound.
- Extensions of the framework.

# Semantic Cutting Planes

Refutation system with lines of the form

$$\sum_{i} a_{i} x_{i} \geq b$$

Variables  $x_i$  are implicitly assumed to be Boolean. Derivation rule:  $\ell_1, \ell_2 \vdash \ell$  if every 0/1 assignment satisfying  $\ell_1, \ell_2$  also satisfies  $\ell$ .

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Two players cooperating to calculate f(x, y). Player 1 knows x.

- Player 2 knows y.
- Example: f(x, y) is  $\langle a, x \rangle + \langle b, y \rangle \ge c$ . Protocol  $P_{\ge}$ :
  - Player 1 sends  $s_1 \triangleq \langle a, x \rangle$ .
  - Player 2 sends  $s_2 \triangleq \langle b, y \rangle$ .
  - Now both can compute  $\langle a, x \rangle + \langle b, y \rangle$ .

Transcript (communicated bits):  $s_1 s_2$ .

Protocol dag is defined by:

- ▶ Set of states S (partial transcripts).
- Starting state  $s_0 \in S$ .
- Set of final states  $F \subset S$ .
- At non-final state s, player P(s) sends a bit b.

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- Protocol transitions to state t(s, b).
- At final state *s*, protocol output is  $\varphi(s)$ .

Protocol also includes:

- Strategy  $\sigma_1(s, x)$  for Player 1.
- Strategy  $\sigma_2(s, y)$  for Player 2.

Correctness:

If Player 1 uses  $\sigma_1$  with her input xand Player 2 uses  $\sigma_2$  with his input ythen  $\varphi(s_{\text{final}}) = f(x, y)$ .

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Players don't have to use  $\sigma_1, \sigma_2!$ When they do: *honest run* for *x*, *y*.

Informally:

A graph on *n* vertices both has an *m*-clique and is (m-1)-colorable.

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We take  $m = \sqrt[3]{n}$ .

Formally:

•  $x_{vi}$ : vertex v is *i*th vertex of clique

- ▶ y<sub>vc</sub>: vertex v gets color c
- ▶  $v \in [n], i \in [m], c \in [m-1]$

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- ▶  $v \in [n], i \in [m], c \in [m-1]$
- $\forall i: \sum_{v} x_{vi} \geq 1$
- $\forall v, i_1 \neq i_2 \colon x_{vi_1} + x_{vi_2} \leq 1$
- $\forall v_1 \neq v_2, i: x_{v_1i} + x_{v_2i} \leq 1$

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- $\forall v, c_1 \neq c_2 \colon y_{vc_1} + y_{vc_2} \leq 1$
- ►  $\forall v_1 \neq v_2, i_1 \neq i_2, c: x_{v_1i_1} + x_{v_2i_2} + y_{v_1c} + y_{v_2c} \leq 3$

# Plan of proof

Basic idea:

Transform a refutation to a monotone circuit of comparable size. Use a monotone circuit lower bound.

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Monotone circuit takes an input graph G, given as edge variables  $G(v_1, v_2)$ .

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- ▶ Returns 1 if *G* has an *m*-clique.
- Returns 0 if G is (m 1)-colorable.

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Lower bound (Alon/Boppana):  $2^{\Omega(\sqrt[3]{n})}$ .

#### Plan of reduction

- Two players (clique player and coclique player) play a game on the proof dag.
- Game starts at the final line, proceeds toward the axioms.
- Game ends at an axiom

$$x_{v_1i_1} + x_{v_2i_2} + y_{v_1c} + y_{v_2c} \le 3.$$

- If  $G(v_1, v_2) = 1$ , clique player wins.
- If  $G(v_1, v_2) = 0$ , coclique player wins.

## Rules of the game

Suppose game is at a line  $\ell$  deduced from  $\ell_1, \ell_2$ .

- Players use protocol  $P_{\geq}$  to determine which of  $\ell_1, \ell_2$  are falsified.
  - Clique player is Player 1.
  - Coclique player is Player 2.
- Record transcripts  $\tau(\ell_1), \tau(\ell_2)$ .
- Local consistency: τ(ℓ), τ(ℓ<sub>1</sub>), τ(ℓ<sub>2</sub>) must correspond to some legal honest run *jointly*.
  - Enforced by limiting what bits players can send.
- If l<sub>1</sub> is falsified, proceed to l<sub>1</sub>, otherwise proceed to l<sub>2</sub>.

# Winning strategy for the clique player

- If G has an *m*-clique:
  - Fix an encoding  $\tilde{x}$  of an *m*-clique.
  - Clique player plays honestly using x

     at state s, she outputs σ<sub>1</sub>(s, x).
  - Local consistency implies:
     each visited line is falsfied by x̃ and some y.
  - Game ends at an axiom

$$x_{v_1i_1} + x_{v_2i_2} + y_{v_1c} + y_{v_2c} \le 3$$

- Must have  $\tilde{x}_{v_1 i_1} = \tilde{x}_{v_2 i_2} = 1$ .
- Since  $\tilde{x}$  encodes a clique,  $G(v_1, v_2) = 1$ .

#### From game to circuit

Convert the game to a monotone circuit:

- Construct the state dag of the game.
- Each time it is the clique player's turn to speak, put an v gate.
- Each time it is the coclique player's turn to speak, put an 
   A gate.

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• Replace a  $(v_1, v_2)$  leaf with  $G(v_1, v_2)$ .

#### From game to circuit

Convert the game to a monotone circuit:

- Construct the state dag of the game.
- Each time it is the clique player's turn to speak, put an ∨ gate.
- Each time it is the coclique player's turn to speak, put an 
   A gate.
- Replace a  $(v_1, v_2)$  leaf with  $G(v_1, v_2)$ .
- Clique player has a winning strategy: circuit outputs 1.
- Coclique player has a winning strategy: circuit outputs 0.

# Size of circuit

Game states:  $\langle \ell, \tau(\ell), \tau(\ell_1), \tau(\ell_2) \rangle$ 

- ► Current node ℓ
- Transcript  $\tau(\ell)$  from previous step

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• Partial transcripts  $\tau(\ell_1), \tau(\ell_2)$ 

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Size of circuit: L2<sup>3C</sup>

- L: number of lines in proof
- C: communication complexity of P<sub>≥</sub> (number of communicated bits)

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Protocol  $P_{\geq}$  involves sending  $\langle a, x \rangle, \langle b, y \rangle$ . If coefficients  $a_i, b_i$  are of size  $2^C$ , communication complexity is roughly O(C). So  $L = \Omega \left( 2^{\sqrt[3]{n} - O(C)} \right)$ .

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Only interesting if  $C = o(\sqrt[3]{n})$ .

Can add random public coin tosses to the game:

- ► Convert game to a monotone *real* circuit.
- ▶ Replace ∨ gates by max gates.
- Coin tosses correspond to average gates.
- Output is probability that clique player wins.

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Pudlák extended the lower bound to this case.

# **Open questions**

Pudlák (1997) proved lower bound for *syntactic* Cutting Planes with arbitrary coefficients, using monotone real circuits.

Can BPR/K be extended to arbitrary coefficients?

Use a randomized "greater than" protocol.

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Allow circuit to err on some inputs.

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- Use a randomized "greater than" protocol.
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Is semantic Cutting Planes stronger than syntactic Cutting Planes?

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